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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Severson's
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim on the Basis of Res
Judicata

Mr. Severson has set out why the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis of res judicata at pages 6-7 of his Opening
Brief. Specifically, the district court erred because the issue decided in the direct appeal (whether
the prosecutorial misconduct at trial rose to the level of fundamental error) was different from the
claim in post-conviction before the court (whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective).
Therefore, neither issue nor claim preclusion can apply and dismissal on the basis of res judicata
was erroneous. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007).
The state concedes that claim preclusion cannot apply because a substantive prosecutorial
misconduct claim, as raised in the direct appeal, is a different claim than a claim that counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct in closing. Respondent's Brief at page
11.

However, the state appears to assert that issue preclusion should be applied because the
prejudice analysis for a substantive claim of prosecutorial misconduct is "more stringent" than
the prejudice standard applied to post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent's Brief at pages 11-12, comparing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. From this the state concludes that Mr. Severson
cannot meet his burden of proving prejudice for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id.

However, the state's conclusion is wrong because the Supreme Court never reached the

question of whether the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the
direct appeal.
In the direct appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct
under the fundamental error standard:
... Misconduct will be regarded as fundamental error when it goes to the
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or ... to the foundation of the case or
takes from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no
court could or ought to permit him to waive. However, even when prosecutorial
misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction will not be reversed
when that error is harmless. Under the harmless error doctrine, a conviction will
stand if the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result
would have been reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not
occurred.
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,716,215 P.3d 414,436 (2009) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).
Without ever reaching the harmless error analysis, the Supreme Court denied appellate
relief because it found that none of the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error that none of the misconduct went to the foundation or basis of Mr. Severson's rights or to the
foundation of the case or took from him a right which was essential to his defense and which no
court could or ought to permit him to waive. In particular, with regard to the misconduct during
closing, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statements that nobody that has testified
knows what happened in the Severson house "did not deprive Severson of due process or render
his trial fundamentally unfair." 147 Idaho at 719,215 P.3d at 439. With regard to the comments
about Mary speaking from her grave, the Court found the comments inflammatory, but held that
"because the statements did not result in an unfair trial or deprive Severson of due process, they
were not fundamental error." 147 Idaho at 720,215 P.3d at 440. With regard to the prosecutor's
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reference's to Mary's family, the Supreme Court held that the statements were "arguably
improper" but did not rise to the level of fundamental error because "[t]he statements did not
impact the fairness of Severson' s trial or deprive him of due process and, therefore, were not
fundamental error." Id. The Court concluded its analysis of the unobjected to prosecutorial
misconduct:
In sum, because none of the prosecutor's statements during closing argument rose
to the level of fundamental error, they do not justify reversing Severson's
conviction.
Id.

The Supreme Court never applied the harmless error standard. Therefore, the state's
argument that issue preclusion should apply is incorrect and should be rejected by this Court.
The district court erred in dismissing based upon res judicata.
B.

Mr. Severson Did Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact
Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Severson has set out how his petition raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
ineffective assistance of counsel thus precluding summary dismissal. Appellant's Opening Brief
at pages 5-18. The state has countered that Mr. Severson is incorrect for two reasons: 1) that Mr.
Severson failed to raise a genuine question of material fact as to prejudice, and 2) that Mr.
Severson failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome a presumption that the failure to object was
a reasonable tactical decision. Respondent's Brief at pages 13-16.
Addressing the state's second argument first - Mr. Severson did raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to deficient perfonnance.
'To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present
evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon
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which the applicant bears the burden of proof.' State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,
72, 90 P.3d 278,297 (2003). A 'primafacie case' means the 'production of
enough evidence to allow the fact-finder to infer the fact at issue and rule in the
party's favor.' Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West
1999)....
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,728,202 P.3d 642, 650 (2007).

In determining whether a prima facie case has been pled, the courts are required to accept
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true and shall liberally construe the facts and reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party on a motion for summary dismissal. Hauschulz v.
State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007). This standard is applied in order to

"avoid dismissal of an inartfully drawn complaint that gives adequate notice of the claims sought
to be asserted." Id, at 834-35, 172 P .3d at 1113-1114, quoting Amco Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Inv.
Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738-39, 101 P.3d 226, 231-232 (2004).

The state has argued that Mr. Severson did not plead a prima facie case of deficient
performance in failing to object to its misconduct in closing, examining each instance of
misconduct individually. Respondent's Brief pages 14-16.
The state begins with what it refers to as the "Fifth Amendment statement." Id., page 14.
The state asserts that the Supreme Court held that its comment that nobody was present in the
house except for Mr. Severson and his wife and neither had testified was not a comment on the
right to remain silent. Id However, that is not what the Supreme Court held. Rather, the
Supreme Court held that "Severson has failed to prove that the prosecutor's statement was an
impermissible comment on his silence that constituted fundamental error." State v. Severson,
147 ldaho at 439,215 P.3d at 719 (emphasis added). Again, the Court was applying the
fundamental error analysis which required it to find that the error violated due process or
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rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The Court did not hold that the statement was proper rather it held that the statement could be given more than one interpretation and that it was one
statement in a 17-day trial so it did not result in a due process violation or a fundamentally unfair
trial. Id This is not a res judicata holding that the statement was not an objectionable instance
of prosecutorial misconduct.
The state next turns to its argument to the jury that Mary was speaking to us from the
grave. While the state acknowledges that the Supreme Court held that the argument was
inflammatory because it was likely designed to appeal to the sympathies and passions of the jury,
147 Idaho at 439-440, 215 P.3d at 719-720, the state continues that the inflammatory comments
were simply referring to Mary's body providing evidence and, "viewed this way" it was not
unreasonable for counsel to not object. Respondent's Brief at page 15. Ignoring for a moment
that the Supreme Court did find that the state's argument before the jury was misconduct
(appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are
impermissible, State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007)), when the
claim must be "viewed this way" to reach a decision against the petitioner, the petitioner has pied
a prima facie case and summary dismissal is not appropriate. Hauschulz v. State, supra,
requiring pleadings to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.
The state lastly argues that the failure to object to clear misconduct in its argument
referencing Mary's family could have been a strategic choice and therefore summary dismissal
was appropriate. The state asserts that counsel may not have objected in order to avoid alienating
the jury by appearing to marginalize Mary. Respondent's Brief at page 15. Again, the state is
arguing that summary dismissal was appropriate because construing Mr. Severson's allegations
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in the light most favorable to the state, the state would prevail after an evidentiary hearing. But,
that is not the standard for summary dismissal. In summary dismissal, the court is required to
accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true and liberally construe the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. Hauschulz v. State, supra. In cases where the
record does not establish a strategic purpose for counsel's actions or where there cannot be a
strategic purpose or where the error is so great even if counsel believed it was a strategic
decision, the strategy itself is deficient performance, summary dismissal is not appropriate.

Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,658,946 P.2d 71, 80 (Ct. App. 1997), holding that errors in
strategy can be so grave that they represent circumstances in which an issue of ineffective
assistance exists; Vickv. State, 131 Idaho 121,952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), holding that
summary disposition was inappropriate where counsel failed to request or provide a report
satisfying the requirements of LC. § 19-2522, did not object to the imposition of sentence
without the benefit of such a report, and did not submit other readily available psychological
information without undertaking an analysis of whether the decision to not act could have been
strategic; Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,443, 163 P.3d 222,232 (Ct. App. 2007), holding that
summary dismissal was inappropriate when the record contained no explanation of why counsel
failed to pursue potentially exculpatory and obtainable information; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
567,225 P.3d 700 (2009), holding that petitioner had set out aprimafacie claim of ineffective
assistance when the record did not show a strategic purpose for the failure to object to incorrect
jury instruction.
In this case, summary disposition was also not appropriate. Counsel did object to other
instances of misconduct - therefore the state's theory that counsel strategically chose not to object
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to this particular piece of misconduct is at best highly speculative and requires drawing
inferences not liberally in favor of Mr. Severson, but rather liberally in favor of the state. As in
Milburn, Vick, Knutsen, and McKay, summary disposition was not appropriate.
The state also argues that Mr. Severson did not plead a prima facie case of prejudice from
the deficient performance. Respondent's Brief at page 12-13. The state's argument is that
because the Supreme Court in the direct appeal found the errors harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, Mr. Severson cannot plead aprimafacie case of prejudice. However, as discussed above,
the Supreme Court did not find that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Rather, the Supreme Court never reached the harmless error analysis. Thus,
the state's argument fails. Moreover, as discussed in the Opening Brief, Mr. Severson did plead
a prima facie case of prejudice.
Because Mr. Severson did plead a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
raising a genuine issue of material fact as to both deficient performance and prejudice resulting in
a denial of his state and federal constitutional rights to counsel, Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, U.S.
Const. Amends. 6 and 14, this Court should reverse the order of partial summary dismissal.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Severson respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the order of partial summary dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.
DATED this

ti!_ day of May, 2014.

D~gAlA(?~C..---:.-Dennis Benj arnin
Attorneys for Larry Severson
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